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COMMENT 
FREEDOM OF CHOICE FOR EVERYONE: THE NEED FOR 
CONSCIENCE CLAUSE LEGISLATION FOR PHARMACISTS 
JESSICA J. NELSON*' 
With ever-increasing advancements in technology comes ever-
increasing controversy. As society in America continues to legalize 
medical products and procedures that conflict with many religious 
traditions, medical professionals frequently have to face the ethical 
dilemma of whether to perform services that they find morally repug-
nant. These professionals are often faced with a choice between fol-
lowing their consciences or losing their jobs. In this time of 
questionable medical advancements, the need for conscience clauses 
has never been greater. If society is prepared to legalize controversial 
health care products and procedures, it must also work to protect 
those who do not agree with them. 
This paper will address the need for federal and state lawmakers 
to create conscience clauses in order to protect medical professionals, 
specifically pharmacists, from being forced to violate their con-
sciences in the workplace. 1 Part I will set forth the need for con-
science protection in general. Part II will examine conscience 
protection from a historical perspective. Part III will explain the in-
adequacy of current legal protections. Part IV will analyze the situa-
tion facing today's pharmacists. Part V will address the reasons that 
pharmacists should be granted protection. Part VI will examine and 
respond to the opposition to conscience clause legislation for pharma-
cists. Finally, Part VII will address the compromise that must be 
* J.D., University of St. Thomas School of Law; B.A., University of St. Thomas. I would 
like to thank my husband Jesse for his patience and support. 
I. This paper is limited to the question of whether the state can/should require a pharmacist 
to fill prescriptions to which the pharmacist has moral objections. It does not address a phar-
macy's right to demand a pharmacist's agreement to fill these prescriptions as a condition of 
employment. Whether a pharmacist has a cause of action for wrongful discharge for refusing to 
fill a prescription against a private employer is an important question, but one that must be saved 
for another paper. For a discussion on the competing rights and interests of health care profes-
sionals and their employers, see Bruce G. Davis, Defining the Employment Rights of Medical 
Personnel within the Parameters of Personal Conscience, 1986 Det. C. L. Rev. 847. 
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made between patients' autonomy and phannacists' right of 
conscience. 
I. THE NEED FOR CONSCIENCE PROTECTION FOR HEALTH 
CARE PROFESSIONALS 
a. Controversial Practices 
Up until the advent of the birth control pill in the 1960s and the legali-
zation of abortion in the 1970s, medical ethics were fairly simple, unambig-
uous, and followed by health care professionals with few exceptions.2 In 
1970, a California Medicine editorial stated, "The traditional Western ethic 
has always placed great emphasis on the intrinsic worth and equal value of 
every human life .... This ethic ... [has been] the keystone of Western 
medicine."3 The editorial continued, "[t]his traditional ethic is ... being 
eroded at its core and may eventually be abandoned .... Hard choices will 
have to be made ... [that will] of necessity violate and ultimately destroy 
the traditional Western ethic with all that portends. It will become neces-
sary and acceptable to place relative rather than absolute values on such 
things as human lives."4 
In the past three and a half decades since these alarming words were 
written, this editorialist's prophecy has largely come true.5 Over the years, 
the "sanctity of life ethic" has essentially vanished from the realm of medi-
cal ethics.6 Today, legality-rather than moral principle7-has become the 
deciding factor. 8 
Recent developments in medicine and pharmaceuticals put health care 
professionals ever more "at the vortex of some of society's most controver-
sial moral dilemmas."9 "Medically-related practices with profound moral 
implications"lo include surgical abortion, chemical abortion (e.g., RU-486), 
human cloning, embryonic stem cell research, sterilization, contraception, 
sex changes, genetic engineering or testing (including gender selection), 
2. Nancy Valko, Are Pro-Life Healthcare Providers Becoming an Endangered Species? 
hup://www.wf-f.org/03-2-Healthcare.html (2003). 
3. A New Ethic for Medicine and Society. I13 Cal. Med. 67 (Sept. 1970). 
4. [d. at 67-68. 
5. Wesley J. Smith, Culture of Death: The Assault on Medical Ethics in America 10 (En-
counter Books 2000). 
6. [d. 
7. For a discussion on bioethics based on moral principles. see James F. Childress, Princi-
ples-Oriented Bioethics: An Analysis and Assessment from Within, in A Matter of Principles? 72 
(Edwin R. DuBose et al. eds .• Trinity Press IntI. 1994). 
8. Valko. supra n. 2. at 'I II. 
9. H.R. Subcomm. on Health of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Hearing on Protect-
ing the Rights of Conscience of Health Care Providers and a Parent's Right to Know. 107th 
Congo 29 (July II, 2002) (prepared statement of Professor Lynn Wardle) [hereinafter Prepared 
Statement of Professor Wardle]. 
10. [d. 
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prenatal testing for genetic disorders, euthanasia, assisted suicide, and capi-
tal punishment by lethal injection. 11 
Because of the growing availability of controversial medical practices, 
federal and state governments need to provide protections for medical pro-
fessionals who refuse to engage in these practices for moral or religious 
reasons.12 To put it another way, health care providers must not be forced 
to provide products or services that violate their own consciences. In our 
democratic society, no one should be forced to act contrary to his or her 
most basic convictions. "The right to refuse to participate in acts that con-
flict with personal ethical, moral, or religious convictions is accepted as an 
essential element of a democratic society."13 When society legalizes mor-
ally controversial products and procedures, it has a duty to provide laws to 
protect those who do not want to participate in them. 14 
b. The Campaign Against Conscience Protection 
Unfortunately, there is a campaign in this country to coerce medical 
providers to submit entirely to the will of the patient. Patients often claim 
that their "rights" to particular services win out when in conflict with a 
health care professional's moral or religious objection to these services. 15 
Along with many other pro-choice representatives, Guttmacher Institute an-
alyst Shannon Criniti believes that "the conscience that matters most be-
longs to the patient."16 Patient autonomy has trumped professional 
autonomy, and as a result, many health care workers and institutions are 
being punished for being faithful to their consciences. 
"Slowly but surely, more and more pro-life doctors, nurses, and other 
health care workers are getting the message that they and their views are 
unwelcome in today's health care system."I? 
For example, New York City became the first U.S. city to require hos-
pitals to provide abortion training for all their OB/GYN resident doctors, 
unless they invoke a narrowly written conscience clause. I8 NARAL (Na-
II. Id. 
12. Bryan A. Dykes, Student Author, Proposed Rights of Conscience Legislation: Expanding 
to Include Pharmacists and Other Health Care Providers, 36 Ga. L. Rev. 565, 567 (2002). 
13. Julie Cantor & Ken Baum, The Limits of Conscientious Objection-May Pharmacists 
Refuse to Fill Prescriptions for Emergency Contraception? 351 New Eng. J. Med. 2008, 2009 
(2004). 
14. See Sean Murphy, Protection of Conscience Project, Establishment Bioethics. http:// 
www.conscience1aws.orglExamining-Conscience-EthicallEthicaI16.html(Apr. 4, 2003). 
15. Teresa Stanton Collett, Protecting the Health Care Provider's Right of Conscience'll 4, 
http://www.cbhd.orgiresourceslhealthcare/colletC2004-04-27_print.htm (Apr. 27, 2004). 
16. Newsmax.com. Court Rules Pharmacist May Object to Abortion Pill 'II 14, http:// 
www.newsmax.comlarchives/articlesl2ooll1l25/184722.shtml (Jan. 26. 2001). 
17. Valko, supra n. 2, at 'II 2. 
18. Linda Villarosa, Newest Skill for Future Ob-Gyns: Abortion Training, N.Y. Times F6 
(June II, 2002) (available at http://www.nytimes.coml2002/Q6/lllhealthlwomenshealthl 
lIABOR.html). 
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tional Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League) and other abortion 
rights activists are hoping to duplicate the initiative in cities within the other 
seventeen states that provide Medicaid-financed abortions. 19 
Pro-choice groups have a number of other initiatives in place to abol-
ish the legal protections afforded in forty-five states to health care providers 
who decline involvement in abortion.20 The Abortion Access Project, 
which operates in twenty-four states, has the goal of "increasing access to 
abortion services by expanding . . . the number of hospitals offering abor-
tion services."21 The project's tactics, it admits, are to "pressure hospi-
tals"22 through both political and legal means, mainly by challenging the 
mergers of religious hospitals with public hospitals?3 
The ACLU's (American Civil Liberties Union) Reproductive Freedom 
Project is advocating the requirement that all hospitals, including Catholic 
ones, provide abortions. The Project's report argues, "When ... religiously 
affiliated organizations move into secular pursuits-such as providing med-
ical care or social services to the public or running a business-they should 
no longer be insulated from secular laws. In the public world, they should 
play by public rules."24 Ironically, the ACLU claims to be an organization 
committed to "defend[ing] and preserv[ing] the individual rights and liber-
ties guaranteed to every person in this country by the Constitution and laws 
of the United States" including the "freedom of religion" found in the First 
Amendment. 25 
Twenty states have adopted mandates to require employers who pro-
vide insurance coverage for employees' prescription drugs to provide cov-
erage for contraceptives as well, including abortifacients such as the 
"morning-after pilL"26 Catholic Charities challenged California's law that 
mandated contraception coverage-even for religiously affiliated organiza-
tions-arguing that the law should be held unconstitutional as a violation of 
religious freedom.27 Religious organizations took a serious blow to their 
19. /d. 
20. U.S. Conf. Catholic Bishops, The Protection of Conscience Project, Repression of Con-
science. The Campaign to Force Hospitals to Provide Abortion, http://www.conscience!aws.org/ 
Repression-Conscience/Conscience· Repression. 30.htm! (Sept. 2(03). 
21. /d. 
22. Abortion Access Project, Why We Need to Increase Accessible Abortion Services at Hos-
pitals, http://www.abortionaccess.org/viewpages.php?id=63 (accessed Nov. 30, 2(05). 
23. ld. 
24. ACLU Reprod. Freedom Project, Religious Refusals and Reproductive Rights It, http:// 
www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/ACF911.pdf (accessed Nov. 30, 2(05). 
25. Am. Civ. Liberties Union, American Civil Liberties Union: About Us, http:// 
www.aclu.orglaboutfindex.html (accessed Nov. 30, 2(05). 
26. See U.S. Conf. Catholic Bishops Secretariat for Pro·Life Activities, On the Health Care 
Providers' Right of Conscience Act (HB 2711). http://www.usccb.orglprolife/issues/abortionlkan-
sas202.htm (Feb. 20, 2002) (citing seventeen states with mandates in 2(02) [hereinafter USCCB 
Testimony]. 
27. Henry 1. Kaiser Fam. Found., Kaiser Daily Reproductive Health Report, Supreme Court 
Rejects Catholic Charities' Appeal of District Court Ruling Upholding California Contraceptive 
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conscience rights when the Supreme Court rejected Catholic Charities' ap-
peal without comment. 28 Federal lawmakers considered a similar bill, the, 
Equity in Prescription Insurance and Contraceptive Coverage Act, which 
would have required all private health plans to cover prescription contra-
ceptives to the same extent that they cover other prescription drugs.29 
For individual medical professionals, "intimidation, harassment, and 
coercion are becoming increasingly common as pro-life health care provid-
ers try to advocate for both their patients and their professional ethics."30 
For example, a nurse was threatened that she would be fired because "she 
refused to follow a doctor's verbal order to increase an intravenous mor-
phine drip 'until he stops breathing' on a patient who continued to survive 
despite having a ventilator removed."31 Doctors told a fellow OB/GYN 
physician they would stop referring patients to him "if he continued to sign 
an annual pro-life ad.'>32 At a conference on ethics committees, an insurance 
company executive recommended that hospitals avoid appointing "family 
values" members to their ethics committees.33 A Cincinnati pharmacist was 
fired from her job for refusing to dispense Micronor, a contraceptive with 
the primary mechanism of preventing implantation of a fertilized embryo, 
which she believed would cause a very early abortion.34 
So, what should be done to protect the right of conscience? Supporters 
of conscientious objection for health care providers must form a campaign 
in support of conscience clause protection on the local. state, and federal 
levels.35 As medical professionals and providers continue to face increasing 
assaults on their conscience rights. lawmakers need to enact statutes to pro-
tect American health care workers' constitutional right to free exercise of 
religion. 
II. THE CASE FOR CONSCIENCE PROTECTION: A 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
a. The Founders' Intention 
The right to be free from coercion to participate in acts that conflict 
with one's moral or religious convictions is an essential element of a demo-
Coverage Law, http://www.kaisemetwork.orgldaily_reports/princreport.cfm?DR_ID=26075&dc 
cat=2 (Oct. 5, 2004). 
28. Catholic Charities of Sacramento. Jnc. v. Cal., 125 S. Ct. 53 (2004). 
29. H.R. 2727, 108th Congo (July 15. 2003); Sen. 1396, 108th Congo (July 11, 2003). 
30. Valko, supra n. 2, at 12. 
31. Jd. at 13. 
32. Jd. 
33. Jd. 
34. Karen L. Brauer, Repression of Conscience, K-Mart Pharmacist Fired for Refusing to 
Dispense Abortifacient, http://www .consciencelaws.orglRepression-Conscience/Conscience-Re-
pression-08.html (accessed Dec. 1, 2005). 
35. Maureen Kramlich, The Assault on Catholic Health Care 1 19, http://www.usccb.org/ 
prolifeJprograms/rlplkramlich.htm (accessed Dec. 1,2005). 
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cratic society. 36 The founders of the Republic recognized freedom of con-
science as so important that they included it in the very first amendment of 
the Constitution: "Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exer-
cise [of religion]."3? The right of conscience that underlies the First 
Amendment preceded even the Declaration of Independence.38 As early as 
June of 1776, the Virginia Declaration of Rights provided that "all men are 
equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of 
conscience."39 
One reason that the founders chose to include freedom of religion in 
the Constitution is because virtue in the citizenry is indispensable for a sys-
tem of self-government to survive. For example, George Washington 
stated, 
Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosper-
ity, Religion and morality are indispensable supports .... Tis sub-
stantially true, that virtue or morality is a necessary spring of 
popular government. The rule indeed extends with more or less 
force to every species of Free Government. Who then is a sincere 
friend to it, can look with indifference upon attempts to shake the 
foundation of the fabric.40 
In other words, as Professor Lynn Wardle puts it, the founders recog-
nized that "[i]f you demand that a man betray his conscience, you have 
eliminated the only moral basis for his fidelity to the rule of law, and have 
destroyed the foundation for all civic virtue."41 
More importantly, freedom of religion was given a special place in the 
American founding, because the framers viewed liberty of conscience as 
inviolable.42 Inalienable rights, such as liberty of conscience, were reserved 
for the people, and the government could not infringe on them because 
those rights are inherent to every human person.43 
James Madison, in his Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious 
Assessments, put it this way: 
It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator such homage, 
and such only, as he believes to be acceptable to him. This duty is 
precedent, both in order of time and in degree of obligation, to the 
claims of Civil Society. Before any man can be considered as a 
36. Cantor & Baum, supra n. 13, at 2009. 
37. U.S. Const. amend. 1. 
38. Prepared Statement of Professor Wardle, supra n. 9, at <j[ 29. 
39. !d. 
40. George Washington, The Papers of George Washington, The Farewell Address fi 25-26, 
http://gwpapers.virginia.eduleducation/lifelquest9.html (accessed Dec. 1, 2005). 
41. Prepared Statement of Professor Wardle, supra n. 9, at <j[ 33. 
42. John Witte, Jr., The Essential Rights and Liberties of Religion in the American Constitu-
tional Experiment, 71 Notre Dame L. Rev. 371,389-94 (1996). 
43. Michael W. McConnell, Freedom from Persecution or Protection of the Rights of Con-
science? A Critique of Justice Scalia's Historical Arguments in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 Wm. 
& Mary L. Rev. 819, 823-24 (1998). 
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member of Civil Society, he must be considered as a subject of 
the Governour of the Universe: And if a member of Civil Society, 
who enters into any subordinate Association, must always do it 
with a reservation of his duty to the General Authority; much 
more must every man who becomes a member of any particular 
Civil Society, do it with a saving of his allegiance to the Univer-
sal Sovereign.44 
145 
Madison explained that freedom of religion is "in its nature an unalienable 
right," because "what is here a right towards men, is a duty towards the 
Creator."45 Madison understood that free exercise did not just mean that 
governments should avoid persecuting religious dissidents, but that "every 
man" has a duty to God that is "precedent, both in order of time and in 
degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society."46 
The Founders concluded that freedom of conscience was a fundamen-
tal, natural right, despite the fact that there was an alternate competing 
view, based on the writings of John Locke.47 Locke viewed religious free-
dom as a mere matter of toleration and accommodation.48 "It makes a big 
difference whether respect for another's moral convictions is given simply 
as a matter of convenience and tolerance (to be suspended when out-
weighed by other political considerations ... ), or whether that is a matter 
of your neighbor's basic civil rights."49 Fortunately, the Founders viewed 
freedom of conscience as a fundamental right, and not just something that 
needed to be tolerated. 50 Early colonial charters and state constitutions 
spoke of this freedom as a right, and the United States Constitution included 
freedom of religious exercise in the Bill of Rights. 51 Unfortunately and 
ironically, though, modern courts and commentators have largely reverted 
to Locke-like thinking, and speak of religious freedom in terms of toleration 
and accommodation instead of rights. 
b. The Court's Interpretation 
A major revision of First Amendment doctrine occurred in Employ-
ment Division v. Smith.52 In Smith, the United States Supreme Court sub-
stantially curtailed the judicial protection previously afforded to rights of 
conscience, holding that "the right of free exercise does not relieve an indi-
44. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments'll 2, http:// 
www.law.ou.edulhistJremon.html (accessed Dec. 21, 2(05). 
45. /d. 
46. ld. 
47. Prepared Statement of Professor Wardle, supra n. 9, at 'I 30. 
48. See John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration (William Popple, trans.). http:// 
www.constitution.org/jUtolerati.htm (accessed Dec. 5, 2(05). 
49. Prepared Statement of Professor Wardle. supra n. 9, at'll 30. 
50. Michael W. McConnell. The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of 
Religion. 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1409. 1449-55 (\990). 
51. ld 
52. Empl. Div .. Dept. of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
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vidual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general 
applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct 
that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).' "53 In other words, "an individ-
ual's religious beliefs [do not] excuse him from compliance with an other-
wise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate."54 So 
long as a statute is a "law[ ] of general applicability" that does not discrimi-
nate against any particular religion or religious group, the law will be sus-
tained if it is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest, despite 
any burden it may have on religious freedom. 55 
The Court acknowledged "leaving accommodation to the political pro-
cess will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are 
not widely engaged in. "56 Calling this an "unavoidable consequence of 
democratic government," the Court stated that it "must be preferred to a 
system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges 
weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious 
beliefs."57 
Many commentators insist that Smith is contrary to the deep logic of 
the First Amendment. First Amendment scholar Judge Michael McConnell 
maintains that the Smith opinion's narrow reading of the free exercise 
clause is problematic: 
The Free Exercise Clause, by its very terms and read in the light 
of its historic purposes, guarantees that believers of every faith, 
and not just the majority, are able to practice their religion with-
out unnecessary interference from the government. . . . It singles 
out a particular category of human activities for particular protec-
tion, a protection that is ... needed by any person of religious 
convictions caught in conflict with our secular political culture. 
For this protection the Smith opinion substitutes a bare require-
ment of formal neutrality. Religious exercise is no longer to be 
treated as a preferred freedom; so long as it is treated no worse 
than commercial or other secular activity, religion can ask no 
more.58 
53. Id. at 879 (quoting U.S. v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n. 3 (1982) (Stevens, J .• concurring)). 
54. Id. 
55. Id. The claimants in Smith were disqualified from receiving Oregon unemployment com-
pensation benefits after they were dismissed from employment for using peyote, a drug they in-
gested for sacramental purposes. The claimants argued that Oregon drug laws should not prohibit 
the use of peyote for religious purposes; however. the Court held that the free exercise clause does 
not prohibit the application of Oregon drug laws to ceremonial ingestion of peyote, and thus the 
state could deny claimants unemployment compensation for work-related misconduct based on 
use of the drug. Id. at 890. 
56. Id. at 890. 
57. Id. 
58. Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 1109, 1152-53 (1990). 
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What this means for health care providers is that they cannot expect courts 
to extend any protection against laws that violate their moral or religious 
beliefs.59 Because Smith essentially "obliterated the shelter of the First 
Amendment for health care providers"60 to refuse to participate in immoral 
practices, the only source of recourse for conscientious objecting medical 
professionals lies with the legislative branch.61 
c. The Rise of Conscience Clauses 
Because the courts offer little protection for freedom of conscience, in 
order to protect the religious rights of health care professionals, the federal 
and state governments need to enact conscience clauses. Conscience 
clauses are statutes or regulations that provide "explicit protection for the 
rights of health care providers to decline to provide or participate in provid-
ing health services that violate their religious or moral beliefs. "62 Though 
they vary in form, these provisions generally prohibit discrimination or ret-
ribution against individuals who refuse to participate in specified medical 
practices or procedures.63 These clauses have been a "time-honored 
method"64 of allowing people to opt out of behavior that conflicts with their 
religious beliefs.65 "The basic principle is that no individual should be 
forced to act in violation of his or her own conscience."66 The Supreme 
Court has upheld the validity of these provisions.67 In Roe v. Wade's68 
companion case, Doe v. Bolton,69 the Supreme Court upheld Georgia's con-
science clause,70 stating, "a physician or any other employee has the right to 
refrain, for moral or religious reasons, from participating in the abortion 
59. Lynn D. Wardle, Protecting the Rights of Conscience of Health Care Providers, 14 J. 
Leg. Med. 177, 217 (1993). 
60. ld. at 216. 
61. The United States Supreme Court has recently agreed to hear a case that may alter Smith. 
On April 18. the Court granted certiorari for Gonzales v. 0 Centro Esp/rita Beneflciente Uniao Do 
Vegetal, 04-1084, agreeing to decide whether a small religious group is allowed a religious ex-
emption from a federal ban on the importation of hallucinogens. Charles Lane, Supreme Court to 
Decide Whether Church Can Import Drug, Washington Post A02 (Apr. 19,2005). 
62. Wardle. supra n. 59, at 178. 
63. Michael 1. Frank, Safeguarding the Consciences of Hospitals and Health Care Person-
nel: How the Graduate Medical Education Guidelines Demonstrate a Continued Need for Protec-
rive Jurisprudence and Legislation, 41 St. Louis U. L.l. 311, 348-49 (1996). 
64. Carol Hogan, Conscience Clauses and the Challenge of Co-operation in a Pluralistic 
Society'll 13, http://www.cacatholic.org/rfconscience.html (Feb. 2003). 
65. Id. 
66. USCCB Testimony, supra n. 26, at'll 2. 
67. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 197 (1973). 
68. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
69. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
70. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 197-98. The Georgia conscience clause stated, in part, "A physician, 
or any other person who is a member of or associated with the staff of a hospital ... who shall 
state in writing an objection to such abortion on moral or religious grounds shall not be required to 
participate .... " Id. at 205. 
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procedure.'!7l Although the Court struck down numerous other provisions 
in the Georgia statute, holding that they were an unconstitutional interfer-
ence with a woman's right to abortion, it left the conscience clause intact. 72 
Even some pro-choice commentators agree that individuals should not 
be forced to participate in procedures that they find morally objectionable 
and are entitled to conscience protection: 
It should be clearly understood at the outset that the validity of 
conscience clauses insofar as they apply to individuals is not in 
question here. An individual has a fundamental right not to en-
gage in any activity-abortion, sterilization or any other activ-
ity-which would be against his or her conscience.73 
Prompted by the legalization of abortion in the infamous Roe v. 
Wade74 decision in 1973, Congress provided its first legislation protecting 
the right to refuse to provide abortion?5 "The Church Amendment" 
named after its sponsor, Senator Frank Church-recognized that, while Roe 
removed government obstacles (laws) to a woman's right to an abortion, it 
did not go so far as to grant women an entitlement to abortion; therefore, 
exemptions for health care providers were in order. 76 The Amendment 
specifies that an individual must not be forced to participate in government-
funded research over moral objections.77 The states soon followed suit, and 
today almost all states provide some protection for health care profession-
als' freedom of conscientious objection to involvement in abortion.78 
Today, the freedom of conscience of health care professionals is cur-
rently recognized and protected by a vast body of laws. At the federal level, 
these laws protect conscientious objection to a range of medical procedures, 
including abortion,79 sterilization,80 and contraception.81 On November 20, 
71. !d. at 197-98. 
72. Irene Prior Loftus, Student Author, I Have a Conscience, Too: The Plight of Medical 
Personnel Confronting the Right to Die, 65 Notre Dame L. Rev. 699, 720 (1990). 
73. Harriet F. Pi1pel & Dorothy E. Patton, Abortion, Conscience and the Constitution: An 
Examination of Federal Institutional Conscience Clauses, 6 Colum. Hum. Rights L. Rev. 279, 284 
(1974-1975). 
74. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
75. Church Amendment to the Health Services Extension Act of 1973.42 U.S.C. § 3OOa-7 
(1973). 
76. Hogan, supra n. 64, at'll 13. 
77. Davis, supra n. I, at 860 (citing 42 U.S.c. § 300a-7 (1985)). 
78. USCCB Testimony, supra n. 26. 
79. See 42 U.S.C. § 3OOa-7(b) (2000) (prohibiting public discrimination against individuals 
and entities that object to pcrforming abonions on the basis of religious beliefs or moral convic-
tions); 42 U.S.C. § 3OOa-7( c) (2000) (prohibiting entities from discriminating against physicians 
and health care personnel who object to perfonning abortions on the basis of religious beliefs or 
moral convictions); 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(e) (2000) (prohibiting entities from discriminating against 
applicants who object to panicipating in abortions on the basis of religious beliefs or moral con-
victions); 42 U.S.c. § 238n (2000) (prohibiting discrimination against individuals and entities that 
refuse to perfonn abortions or train in their perfonnance); 20 U.S.C. § 1688 (2000) (ensuring that 
federal sex discrimination standards do not require educational institutions to provide or pay for 
abonions or abortion benefits). 
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2004, the United States Congress approved a spending bill that includes the 
Hyde-Weldon Conscience Protection Amendment, which provides: 
None of the funds made available in this Act may be made availa-
ble to a Federal agency or program, or to a State or local govern-
ment, if such agency, program, or government subjects any 
institutional or individual health care entity to discrimination on 
the basis that the health care entity does not provide, pay for, 
provide coverage of, or refer for abortions.82 
In other words, the Amendment prohibits discrimination against health care 
providers who decline to be involved with abortions. 
While most federal and state conscience clause legislation focuses al-
most exclusively on objection to abortion, many states also provide protec-
tion for those who refuse to participate in a broader range of ethically 
sensitive medical procedures.83 Conscience clauses are often included in 
legal mandates for proscribed activities, usually at the request of impacted 
Catholic institutions.84 For example, Oregon recognized the need for con-
science protection when it enacted its Death with Dignity Act, providing 
that health care workers, including pharmacists, who are morally opposed 
to physician-assisted suicide, can be free not to participate without fear of 
retribution.85 
Only one state, Vermont, does not have any kind of conscience protec-
tion on its books.86 The other forty-nine states provide at least some kind of 
protection for rights of conscience for at least some health care profession-
als under at least some circumstances.87 The state of Illinois has adopted 
one of the most comprehensive right-of-conscience laws in the country, 
80. See 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b) (2000) (prohibiting public discrimination against individuals 
and entities that object to performing sterilizations on the basis of religious beliefs or moral con-
victions); 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(c) (2000) (prohibiting entities from discriminating against physi-
cians and health care personnel who object to performing sterilizations on the basis of religious 
beliefs or moral convictions); 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(e) (2000) (prohibiting entities from discriminat-
ing against applicants who object to participating in sterilizations on the basis of religious beliefs 
or moral convictions). 
81. See Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act of2002. Pub. L. No. 107-67, 
§ 641, 115 Stat. 514, 554-55 (2002) (prohibiting health plans participating in the federal em-
ployee health benefits program from discriminating against individuals who, for religious or moral 
reasons, refuse to prescribe or otherwise provide for contraceptives, and protecting the right of 
health plans that have religious objections to contraceptives to participate in the program). 
82. Consolidation Appropriations Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447, § 508(d)(I), 118 Stat. 
2809,3163 (2005). 
83. w. Cole Durham, Jr., Mary Anne Q. Wood & Spencer 1. Condie, Accommodation of 
Conscientious Objection to Abortion: A Case Study of the Nursing Profession, 1982 BYU L. Rev. 
253,309 (1982). 
84. Hogan, supra n. 64, at 3. 
85. Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 127.885(4.01)(4) (2003). 
86. Prepared Statement of Professor Wardle, supra n. 9, at 29. 
87. [d.; see also Health Care Rights of Conscience: Current State Statutes, http:// 
www.unitedforlife.org!guides!archivelroclroc_statute~ide.htm (Nov. 200 I) [hereinafter Health 
Care Rights of Conscience]. 
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under which civil rights protection is afforded to all health care providers 
and extends to any procedure "which is contrary to the conscience of such 
physician or health care personnel."88 Mississippi also provides generous 
protection for all health care providers to "decline to comply with an indi-
vidual instruction or health-care decision for reasons of conscience."89 The 
state of Washington provides comprehensive conscience protection for con-
scientious objectors participating in all health care services, but only for 
individual health care providers and religiously affiliated health care plans 
and facilities.90 The other states' right-of-conscience laws are not as com-
prehensive as those of Illinois, Mississippi, and Washington. As mentioned 
above, most provide protection only for those who decline to participate in 
abortion.91 
III. THE INADEQUACY OF CURRENT LEGAL PROTECTION 
a. Current Statutes Are Too Narrow 
While the principle of protection for the right of conscience is widely 
acknowledged, the current laws only provide a patchwork of protection, 
leaving gaping holes in the protection needed for all health care profession-
als.92 Most federal statutes are connected to the receipt of federal funds or 
to specific federal programs, which makes their scope limited.93 In addi-
tion, since most state statutes only protect physicians, hospitals, and hospi-
tal employees from being forced to perform abortions, many medical 
practices are not included and many individuals and institutions are left 
unprotected.94 As noted above, few existing statutes protect the full range 
of institutions and individuals that may be involved in the increasingly com-
plex and controversial health care system.95 "As the range of medical tech-
nologies continues to expand and social mores change, the number of 
88. 745 Ill. Compo Stat. 70/1-14 (1998); see also 720 Ill. Compo Stat. 510/13 (2000). 
89. Miss. Code Ann. § 41-41-215(5) (2004). 
90. Wash. Rev. Code §§ 9.02.150, 48.43.065. 70.47.160 (2000). 
91. For a complete list of state conscience clauses, see Health Care Rights of Conscience, 
supra n. 87 (providing an overview of current rights of conscience laws); Prepared Statement of 
Professor Wardle, supra n. 9, at 31 (appendix, providing text from each state's conscience pro-
tecting statutes, current as of 2(02). 
92. Wardle. supra n. 59, at 180-181. 
93. See 42 U.S.c. §§ 300a-7(b), 300a-7(c), 300a-7(e) (2000) (conscience protections limited 
to entities that receive and individuals who work in entities that receive federal funds under the 
Public Health Service Act, Community Mental Health Centers Act, Developmental Disabilities 
Services and Facilities Construction Act, or Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of 
Rights Act of 2000); Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 2002, Pub. L. No. 
107-67, § 641, 115 Stat. 514,554-55 (2002) (protections under only the federal employee health 
benefits program); 18 U.S.c. § 3597(b) (2005) (protects only prosecutors. correctional, and other 
enumerated personnel in the context of federal death penalty cases and executions). 
94. USCCB Testimony, supra n. 26. 
95. /d. 
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medical services involving potentially serious conflicts of conscience is cer-
tain to increase."96 
b. Statutes Are Subject to Hostile Judicial Interpretation 
Another increasing problem for conscientious objectors comes from 
the judicial branch. Even after states enact conscience protection for medi-
cal professionals, judges often interpret the conscience clauses very nar-
rowly, and will jump through any available loophole without protecting the 
conscience of the health care professionaL Courts are quick to downplay 
the needs of a medical professional's conscience.97 As one commentator 
noted, "even broadly constructed statutes face ... problem[s] .... [A]n 
adequate conscience provision may be narrowly construed by a judiciary 
which is less than sympathetic to the principles of the objector's 
conscience. "98 
Strict interpretation of the statutory language is the ordinary rule in 
conscience clause cases.99 As a result, any effort of a state legislature to 
afford conscience protection may be diminished through adverse judicial 
interpretation. 1°O For example, courts have narrowly interpreted the term 
"abortion," and a California court denied a hospital conscience protection in 
Brownfield v. Daniel Freeman Marina Hospital,101 holding that estrogen 
pregnancy prophylaxis was not the same as abortion. 102 Similarly, a Penn-
sylvania court in Spellacy v. Tri-County HospitaP03 concluded that the state 
conscience clause only protected those forced to be directly involved with 
abortions. Thus, an admissions clerk who was fired by the hospital as a 
result of her refusal to participate in the admission of abortion patients was 
left without recourse. 104 
A district court in Montana denied relief to a nurse-anesthetist who 
was fired from her job for refusing to perform a sterilization procedure, 
despite the fact that Montana has a conscience clause stating, "All persons 
shall have the right to refuse ... to participate in sterilization."105 The 
district court reasoned that the nurse's right to refuse was "far outweighed" 
by both the rights of the hospital and the nurse's inability to be an effective 
96. Wardle, supra n. 59, at IS\. 
97. Judith F. Daar, Medical Futility and Implications for Physician Autonomy, 21 Am. J. L. 
& Med. 221, 229 (1995). 
98. Frank, supra n. 63, at 349. 
99. Wardle, supra n. 59, at 199. 
100. Id. at 349. 
WI. 256 Cal. Rptr. 240 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1989). 
102. Id. at 245. 
103. 1978 WL 3437 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pleas Mar. 23. 1975). affd, 395 A.2d 998 (Pa. Super. 
1978). 
104. /d. 
105. Swanson v. St. John's Lutheran Hosp., lS2 Mont. 414, 427-28 (1979) (reversing the 
district court's decision). 
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hospital employee, even though the state legislature did not see fit to in-
clude such provisions in the conscience clause. 106 
Additionally, in Alaska, even though there is a conscience clause pro-
tecting hospitals' rights not to participate in abortion,107 the state supreme 
court ruled that private hospitals receiving state or federal funds were re-
quired to allow an abortionist to perform abortions in its surgical suites, 
because the hospital, by receiving state money, had become a "quasi-pub-
lic" institution. 108 
Because the already limited protections afforded by the legislatures are 
subject to hostile interpretation by the courts, lawmakers need to craft more 
expansive statutes that provide specific protection for particular health care 
professionals. "With new organized threats to conscience on the horizon, it 
is especially important for states to expand and strengthen their existing 
protections now."109 One such group that needs specific protection is 
pharmacists. 
IV. PHARMACISTS ON THE BATTLEGROUND: THE NEED FOR 
SPECIFIC PROTECTION 
a. The Current Situation 
Pharmacists currently face a great deal of heat for their conscientious 
objection to medical products. While others are often protected from con-
troversial procedures, pharmacists have fallen through the cracks of the le-
gal protection of conscience. In most states, pharmacists with conscientious 
objections to abortifacients and lethal drugs are left defenseless. 
Legislatures in twenty-two states are proposing bills that would pro-
vide conscience protections,110 but only three states currently have con-
science rights statutes that specifically protect pharmacists. Arkansas, 1 J 1 
106. Id. 
107. Alaska Stat. § IS.16.01O(b) (l99S) ("Nothing in this section requires a hospital or person 
to participate in an abortion ... "). 
lOS. Valley Hosp. Assn., Inc. v, Mat-su Coalition for Choice, 948 P.2d 963 (Alaska 1997); see 
also H.R. Subcomm. on Health of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Hearing on Protecting 
the Rights of Conscience of Health Care Providers and a Parent's Right to Know, 107th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 12 (July 11,2002) (Prepared Statement of Karen Vosburgh, Director of the Board of Valley 
Hospital); Collett, supra n. 15. 
109. USCCB Testimony, supra n. 26. 
110. These states are Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, 
Tennessee, Texas, Vennont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Henry J. Kai-
ser Fam. Found., Sen. Boxer Introduces Federal Legislation to Require Pharmacists to Fill all 
Prescriptions, Including Contraceptives, http://www.kaisernetwork.orgldaily_reportsiprincreport. 
cfm?DR_ID=29436&dccat=2 (Apr. 19,2005); see also Stuart Shepard, Pharmacists Seek Con-
science-Clause Protection, http://www.family.orglcforumlfnif/news/a0036020.cfm (Mar. 30, 
2005). 
Ill. Ark. Code Ann. § 20-16-304 (2005) ("Nothing in this subchapter shall prohibit a physi-
cian, phannacist, or any other authorized paramedical personnel from refusing to furnish any 
contraceptive procedures, supplies, or infonnation ... "). 
2005] FREEDOM OF CHOICE FOR EVERYONE 153 
Mississippi,112 and South Dakota 113 all have laws that protect pharmacists 
from being forced to fill certain prescriptions when it would constitute a 
violation of conscience. Georgia officials have adopted a regulation in the 
Georgia Code of Professional Conduct allowing pharmacists to refuse to fill 
prescriptions.114 The Arizona legislature passed a similar law, but it was 
recently vetoed by the governor. 1 IS 
Not only is there a lack of legal protection for conscientious-objecting 
pharmacists, but there is also a growing campaign to pass laws that would 
force pharmacists to fill all prescriptions, regardless of matters of con-
science. For example, the Pro-Choice Resource Center's Spotlight Cam-
paign "organizes regional meetings to build a network of opposition to 
'conscience' ... clauses that allow ... pharmacists ... to deny women 
access to services like abortion."1l6 
On the national legislative front, Representative Carolyn McCarthy 
(D-NY) has recently introduced a bill into Congress that would "amend the 
Public Health Services Act with respect to the responsibilities of a phar-
macy when a pharmacist employed by the pharmacy refuses to fill a valid 
prescription for a drug on the basis of religious beliefs or moral con vic-
tions."1l7 Under the proposed law, if an employee of a pharmacy declines 
to fill a prescription because of religious or moral objections, the pharmacy 
will be subject to a civil penalty and can be sued by the patient for actual 
and punitive damages. 118 
In addition, at the state level, the Nevada State Assembly, at the urging 
of Planned Parenthood, approved an amendment to stop pharmacists with 
religious objections from refusing to fill prescriptions for any drug, includ-
ing abortifacient contraceptives. 119 Legislation has been proposed in Cali-
fornia, Missouri, New Jersey, and West Virginia that would require 
pharmacists to fill all prescriptions, even those to which they are morally 
112. Miss. Code Ann. § 41-107-5 (2005) (A health care provider (including phannacists and 
phannacy employees) "has the right not to participate" in "a health care service that violates his or 
her conscience."). 
113. S.D. Codified Laws § 36-11-70 (2000) (protecting the civil rights of pharmacists who 
may conscientiously object to dispensing medication that will cause abortion, assisted suicide, or 
euthanasia). 
114. Ga. Admin. Code § 480-5-.03(n) (2005) ("it shall not be considered unprofessional con-
duct for any phannacist to refuse to fill any prescription based on hislher ... ethical or moral 
beliefs. "). 
115. See Ann Walker, "Conscience Clause" Hurts Women, Yuma Sun (Apr. 14,2005) (avail-
able at http://sun.yumasun.comlartmanJpublishlarticles/story_I6039.php). 
116. U.S. Conf. Catholic Bishops, supra n. 20. 
117. H.R. 1539, 109th Congo (Apr. 8, 2005) (referred to the Committee on Energy and 
Commerce). 
118. [d. at § 249(c)(2). 
119. Nev. Assembly 144, 72d Sess. (Feb. 14, 2003); Ed Vogel. Assembly Voice Vote: Phar-
macists Told to Heed Doctors' Rx: Role of Religious Beliefs, Dispensing Medicine Debated, Las 
Vegas Rev. J. (Apr. 4, 2003), (available at http://www.reviewjoumal.com!lvILhome/2003/Apr-
04-Fri-2003/news/21036565.html). 
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opposed. 120 The pharmacist licensing board in North Carolina recently 
"clarified its policy to prevent pharmacists from obstructing customers from 
filling prescriptions." 121 
In March 2005, Illinois Governor Rod R. Blagojevich issued an "emer-
gency regulation" to force pharmacists in the state to fill all legal prescrip-
tions for legal drugs. 122 One pharmacist has already filed suit, challenging 
the "emergency rule," alleging it is void because it violates pharmacists' 
rights protected by the Illinois Healthcare Right of Conscience Act123 (iron-
ically, one of the most expansive conscience clauses in the country),124 and 
because it exceeds the governor's authority under state and federal law. 125 
In the last year, at least fifteen pharmacists have found themselves in 
court for refusing to dispense pharmaceuticals that contradicted their con-
sciences. 126 In Wisconsin, an administrative judge recently recommended a 
reprimand and remedial ethics classes for Catholic pharmacist Neil Noesen, 
because he declined to fill or transfer a prescription for contraceptives based 
on his religious objection.127 The judge also required Noesen to pay the full 
cost of the proceedings, which are estimated at $20,000. 128 
b. Moral Objections to Certain Medications 
The three main categories of prescription drugs to which pharmacists 
have religious or ethical objections are drugs that act as abortifacients, le-
thal drugs used for the purpose of assisted suicide, and those used for capi-
tal punishment. 
i. Abortifacients 
Perhaps the most controversial abortifacient drug is RU-486 (also 
called Mifepristone, and sold in the United States under the brand name 
Mifeprex), which is used up to seven weeks into a woman's pregnancy.129 
120. Henry J. Kaiser Fam. Found., supra n. 27; see also Kari Lydersen, Illinois Rule Says 
Phannacies Must Fill Orders for Birth Control, Seattle Times A6 (Apr. 2, 2005). 
121. Lydersen, supra n. 120. 
122. Steve Chapman, From the Right to Choose to the Power to Compel, BaIt. Sun 11 A (Apr. 
11, 2005). 
123. 745 TIL Compo Stat. 70/1 (2000). 
124. Prepared Statement of Professor Wardle, supra n. 9, at 31. 
125. Am. Fam. Assn., Pro-Life PhamUlcy Worker Wants Court to Cancel Contraceptive Or-
der. http://headlines.agapepress.org/archive/4/afal192oo5b.asp (Apr. 19,2005). 
126. Stuart Shepard, Phannacists Seek Conscience-Clause Protection, http://www.family.org/ 
cforumlfniflnews/a0036020.cfm (Mar. 30, 2005). 
127. Carol Ukens, PhamUlcist Faces Discipline for Refusal to Transfer Script, http:// 
www.drugtopics.comldrugtopicslcontentlprintContentPopup.jsp?id=153753 (Apr. 4, 2005). 
128. Todd Richmond, Phannacy Board Approves Sanctions Against Phannacist: Neil Noesen 
Refused to Fill Prescription for Birth Control Pills, St. Paul Pioneer Press B3 (Apr. 14, 2005). 
129. Off. Population Research Princeton U. & Assn. Reprod. Health Professionals, The Emer-
gency Contraception Website. http://ec.princeton.edu (last updated Nov. 2(05) [hereinafter Emer-
gency Contraception Website] at http://ec.princeton.edu/questions/ecnotru.htmL Although 
mifepristone is currently distributed to women directly from doctors and certain health clinics, it is 
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Many pro-life pharmacists are opposed to dispensing emergency contracep-
tion, basically large doses of existing birth control pills (or another drug, 
levonorgestrel, known as Plan B), which can have an abortifacient effect. 130 
Some pharmacists refuse to prescribe any form of birth control pills, be-
cause of the possibility that the drug will lead to a chemical abortion. 131 
Although abortion rights organizations deny that emergency contra-
ceptives cause abortions,132 the reason that they rule out abortion is because 
they base their understanding of the beginning of human life on the United 
States Food and Drug AdministrationlNational Institutes of Health and the 
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists definition of the be-
ginning of pregnancy as the implantation of a fertilized egg in the lining of 
a woman's uterus. 133 According to this view, since emergency contracep-
tives work before implantation, the woman is not "pregnant" before this 
time. 134 
However, not all medical professionals adhere to the FDA as the 
source of determining when life begins. In a hearing before a Senate Judici-
ary Subcommittee, a number of medical experts testified on the question of 
when life begins and many concluded that it begins at conception.135 For 
example, Dr. Jerome Lejeune, Genetics Professor at the University of 
Descartes in Paris and the discoverer of the Downs Syndrome chromosomal 
pattern, testified, "[A]fter fertilization has taken place, a new human being 
has come into being." He stated that this is "no longer a matter of taste or 
opinion" and "not a metaphysical contention, it is plain experimental evi-
dence."136 Dr. Hymie Gordon, Chairman of the Department of Genetics at 
important to mention this drug because the potential for pharmaceutical access exists. Donald W. 
Herbe, Student Author, The Right to Refuse: A Call for Adequate Protection of a Pharmacist's 
Right to Refuse Facilitation of Abortion and Emergency Contraception, 17 J.L. & Health 77, 
82-83 (2002-03). 
130. Depending on the time that they are taken during the woman's menstrual cycle, emer-
gency contraceptives may inhibit or delay ovulation, inhibit tubal transport of the egg or sperm, 
interfere with fertilization, or alter the endometrium (the lining of the uterus), thereby inhibiting 
implantation of the embryo. Emergency Contraception Website, supra n. 129, at http:" 
ec. princeton .edu/questionsl ecabt.html. 
131. Hormonal contraceptives have three mechanisms of action: I) prevent ovulation, 2) 
thicken the cervical mucus to prevent sperm from entering the uterus and fallopian tube, and 3) 
alter the lining of the uterus so implantation cannot take place. PDR Health, Hormonal Options: 
Pills. Shots. and Implants, http://www.pdrhealth.com/contentlwomen_healthlchapters/fgwh21. 
shtml (last updated 2004). The third action, if and when it occurs, is an abortifacient. because 
human life has begun but cannot continue to develop without the nourishment provided through 
the mother's uterine wall. 
132. Emergency Contraception Website, supra n. 129. 
133. Cornm. on Terminology, Am. College Obstetricians & Gynecologists, Obstetric-Gyneco-
logic Terminology (E.c. Hughes ed., F.A. Davis Co. 1972). 
134. Protection of Human Subjects. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102 (Mar. 9, 1983). 
135. Sen. Subcornm. on Separation of Powers of the Jud. Comm., The Human Life Bill: Hear-
ings on S. 158, 97th Congo (Apr. 23-24, 1981). 
136. Id. 
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the Mayo Clinic verified that "[b]y all the criteria of modern molecular 
biology, life is present from the moment of conception."137 
ii. Drugs Used for Assisted Suicide 
The majority of pharmacists object to the dispensation of drugs for 
assisted suicide. Physician-assisted suicide is defined by the American So-
ciety of Health-System Pharmacists as "[t]he practice by some health pro-
fessionals of providing a competent patient with pharmaceutical means for 
the patient to use with the primary intention of ending his or her own 
life."138 One survey found that 76% of pharmacists believe that they should 
be able to refuse to participate in assisted suicide, but also felt that their job 
might be at stake if they did SO.139 In Oregon, where assisted suicide is 
legal, there is a conscience clause that protects healthcare workers; how-
ever, pharmacists may not be covered by the clause because it refers to 
those involved in administering the drugs, and pharmacists do not adminis-
ter, they dispense. 140 The pharmacist provides the patient the means to com-
mit suicide by dispensing a drug prescribed by a doctor in a lethal dose to 
bring about the end of the patient's life. 141 Those pharmacists who believe 
that medication should not be used to end life should be allowed to opt out 
of the process. 
iii. Drugs Used for Capital Punishment 
Another category of objectionable lethal drugs dispensed by pharma-
cists are those to be used for executions via lethal injection. Pharmacists 
are involved in the execution process because they are the ones who prepare 
and dispense these lethal substances for the Department of Corrections. 142 
A handful of states have even enacted statutes that allow departments of 
corrections to obtain the lethal drugs from pharmacists without a prescrip-
tion.143 However, many pharmacists who oppose capital punishment be-
lieve that they should not be required to participate in the lethal injection 
process. As the executive vice president of the Florida Pharmacy Associa-
tion said, "I believe pharmacists should not be forced into participating in 
137. Id. 
138. Marjorie Weiss, A Role for the Pharmacist in Physician-Assisted Suicide? 265 Phann. J. 
649 (Oct. 28, 2000). 
139. Karen Snyder, Ethical Hot Spots: What Should You Do? 141 Drug Topics 41 (Jan. 20, 
1997). 
140. Stephanie E. Harvey et aI., Do Phormacists Have the Right to Refuse to Dispense a 
Prescription Based on Personal Beliefs?, http://www.nm-phannacy.com!body_rights.htm (ac-
cessed Apr. 19, 2005). 
141. Id. 
142. Donna Young, Florida's Lethal-Injection Process Involves Phannacist, 58 Am. J. 
Health-System Phann. 1688, 1688 (Sept. 1,2001). 
143. Human Rights Watch, Appendix: Methods of Execution: by State, http://www.hrw.org/ 
reports/1994/usdp/IO.htm (accessed Apr. 27, 2005) (no prescription needed in Delaware, Idaho. 
Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and South Dakota). 
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such activities .... It boils down to a right of conscience whether to partici-
pate or not." 144 
V. REASONS FOR CONSCIENCE PROTECTIONS FOR PHARMACISTS 
a. Pharmacists, Like Physicians, Are Professionals 
Pharmacists are not just prescription-dispensing machines-they are 
integral members of the health care team. Society relies on pharmacists to 
ensure the safety of drugs prescribed in combination and to instruct patients 
on the appropriate use of medications.145 Pharmacists have traditionally 
served an important role as the guardian and gatekeeper of the nation's drug 
supply.146 They are already given a great deal of discretion in exercising 
their professional judgment in refusing to dispense medications. For exam-
ple, they screen prescriptions for drug interactions, allergies, and proper 
dosage for the safety and welfare of the patient.147 The Indiana Supreme 
Court ruled that a pharmacist has a duty to refuse to dispense medications 
based on professional judgment. 148 Thus, a pharmacist is not required to 
dispense a prescription just because a doctor prescribed it. 
Pharmacists are highly trained professionals with ethical and moral ac-
countability. It is inappropriate and condescending to deny a pharmacist's 
right to exercise personal judgment in refusing to fill certain pre scrip-
tions.149 In making professional judgments about pharmaceuticals, it is dif-
ficult to draw the line between where a pharmacist's professional judgment 
ends and moral judgment begins. The two are difficult to separate. If we 
allow pharmacists to refuse to fill prescriptions based on other grounds, 
why should we force them to fill those that they find morally abhorrent? 
b. Pharmacists Should Not Have to Abandon Their Morals 
Society is confused when it denies pharmacists their conscience rights; 
it wants its workers to be conscientious but not to have a conscience. This 
is a contradiction. Most professionals are not required to abandon their 
morals in the workplace. For example, lawyers are free to choose the clients 
and issues that they represent. ISO Likewise, society should not force phar-
144. Young, supra n. 142. 
145. Cantor & Baum, supra n. 13, at 2010. 
146. David B. Brushwood, The Professional Capabilities and Legal Responsibilities of Phar-
macists: Should "Can" Imply "Ought"? 44 Drake L. Rev. 439, 461 (1996). 
147. Wis. Sen. Labor Comm., Hearing on Sen. Bill 21 (Mar. 5,2003) (testimony of pharma-
cist Yvonne Klubertanz, R.Ph.) [hereinafter Klubertanz Testimony]. 
148. Hooks SuperX, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 642 N.E. 2d 514 (Ind. 1994). 
149. Cantor & Baum, supra n. 13, at 2010. 
150. Model R. Prof. Conduct 1.16(b)(4) (ABA 2002) ("A lawyer may withdraw from repre-
senting a client if ... [the] client insists upon taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or 
with which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement."); see also Teresa Stanton Collett, Speak 
No Evil, Seek No Evil, Do No Evil: Client Selection and Cooperation with Evil, 66 Fordham L. 
Rev. 1339 (Mar. 1998). 
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macists to leave their faith and morality at the door when they enter the 
pharmacy.l5l Doing so would be dehumanizing to individual pharmacists 
and would cause the pharmacy profession to become robotic. 
Responding to the need for conscience protection for pharmacists, the 
American Pharmaceutical Association (AphA) adopted a policy that recog-
nizes a pharmacist's right to refuse dispensing medications based on the 
pharmacist's personal beliefs. 152 However, as noted above, this policy has 
not stopped states from mandating pharmacists to fill all legal prescrip-
tions. 153 In those states, should Catholic pharmacists be forced out of the 
profession as counter-revolutionaries just because they abide by the ethics 
of the magisterium of the Catholic Church? To force a pharmacist to par-
ticipate in the taking of an innocent human life should never be a principle 
of law or professional ethics.154 
There is currently a shortage of health care professionals in America, 
and pharmacists are especially in high demand. I55 It would be an injustice 
to society to refuse equal opportunity for pharmacists who object to dis-
pensing medications that cause the death of a person. 156 As one pharmacist 
notes, "Pharmacists should have the right like any health professional to 
define their scope of practice and practice with integrity and dignity. We, 
like our patients, should not be treated as a means to an end. It is not right to 
force someone to do something against their conscience."157 
The public typically rates pharmacists as the most trusted professionals 
(even above clergy), according to the Gallup Poll list of professionals rated 
for their "honesty and ethical standards."158 However, "[g]iven that most 
Americans do not believe in abortion-on-demand, one wonders if pharma-
cists will continue to be held in such high regard if the American people 
understand what may be required of employee pharmacists, and perhaps 
eventually all pharmacists."159 It would be a great disservice to society to 
strip pharmacists of their ability to make moral decisions. 
151. Cantor & Baum, supra n. 13, at 2009. 
152. Am. Pharm. Assn., Report of the House Delegates, Subject: Pharmacist Conscience 
Clause, http://www.aphanet.orglleadlhod.html(1998) ("APhA recognizes the individual pharma-
cist's right to exercise conscientious refusal and supports the establishment of systems to ensure 
patient access to legally prescribed therapy without compromising the pharmacist's right to con-
scientious refusaL"). 
153. See infra sec. VI(a). 
154. Herbe, supra n. 129, at 102. 
155. Klubertanz Testimony, supra n. 147. 
156. [d. 
157. [d. 
158. Am. Pharm. Assn., Facts About Pharmacists and Pharmacies, http://www.aphanet.orgl 
AMrr emplate.cfm?Section==Search&Template==ICMIHTMLDisplay .cfm&ContentID=353 7 (ac-
cessed Apr. 22, 2005). 
159. Brauer, supra n. 34. 
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c. Freedom to Exercise One's Conscience Is a Fundamental Right 
As our nation's founding fathers recognized, freedom of conscience is 
a fundamental human right. l60 James Madison explained that this freedom 
is "in its nature an unalienable right" because "what is here a right towards 
men, is a duty towards the Creator."161 Pharmacists do not only have a duty 
to their profession and patients; many also have a duty to God. For these 
pharmacists, true conscience recognizes a higher being that obliges it to 
perform certain actions and avoid others. 162 As Cardinal John Henry New-
man, a great defender of the rights of conscience, put it: "Conscience has 
rights because it has duties." 163 
Madison called these duties to the Creator "precedent, both in order of 
time and in degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society."l64 George 
Washington maintained that "the conscientious scruples of all men should 
be treated with great delicacy and tenderness" and laws should "always be 
as extensively accommodated" to them as "a due regard to the protection 
and essential interests of the nation may justify and permit."165 As Pope 
John Paul II said, 
To refuse to take part in committing an injustice is not only a 
moral duty; it is also a basic human right. Were this not so, the 
human person would be forced to perform an action intrinsically 
incompatible with human dignity, and in this way human freedom 
itself, the authentic meaning and purpose of which are found in its 
orientation to the true and the good, would be radically compro-
mised. What is at stake therefore is an essential right which, pre-
cisely as such, should be acknowledged and protected by civil 
law. 166 
Because it is an inalienable right, each person should be free to act consist-
ently with the dictates of his or her conscience and no pharmacist should be 
forced to perform an act that would violate his or her core beliefs. 
VI. THE OTHER SIDE OF THE DEBATE 
While many states are proposing conscience clause legislation for 
pharmacists, reproductive and euthanasia rights activists are vehemently 
160. See supra sec. Il(a). 
161. Madison, supra n. 44, at 299. 
162. George Cardinal Pell, The Inconvenient Conscience, 153 First Things 22, 26 (May 2005). 
163. John Henry Newman, A Letter Addressed to His Grace the Duke of Norfolk: Difficulties 
Felt by Anglicans in Catholic Teaching 250 (Uniform ed., Longman, Green & Co. 1868-1881). 
164. Madison, supra n. 44, at 299. 
165. George Washington, Letter to the Religious Society Called Quakers (Oct. 1789), in 
George Washington on Religious Liberty and Mutual Understanding 11, II (Edward Frank 
Humphreyed., 1932). 
166. Pope John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae, No. 74 (Mar. 25, 1995) (available at http://www. 
vatican. va/holy _father/john_pauUi/encyc1icals/documents/hfjp-ii_enc_25031995 _evangelicum-
vitae_en.html). 
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against these types of conscience clauses, and are seeking to block legisla-
tion that would afford any of these protections. 167 The opponents of con-
science protection for pharmacists pose four main arguments for why 
pharmacists should be forced to dispense all legal prescriptions. First, they 
argue that a patient's autonomy should trump a pharmacist's right to con-
science. 168 A second argument is that a pharmacist should not be allowed 
to impose his or her views on the patient. 169 Third, opponents argue that 
conscience clauses have potential for abusepo Finally, advocates against 
conscience protection argue that pharmacists will block access to certain 
drugs}?l 
a. Viewing Autonomy as Freedom to Choose Good 
The argument that a patient's right to autonomy is more important 
than-and should never be limited by-a pharmacist's right to conscience 
is based on a flawed view of autonomy. Society once valued autonomy in 
the light of the moral laws to which we are bound; "it now understands 
autonomy as the existential liberty to compose our lives, and even reality, 
for ourselves."I72 Our culture equates autonomy with freedomJrom a given 
thing: "freedom from constraint, from rules, from direction, from guidance, 
from immutable principles."173 With this understanding of freedom, patient 
autonomy becomes the patient's right to do anything he or she desires. 
However, this definition of autonomy is dangerous and misplaced. 
Freedom is an essential part of human dignity, so it is obviously im-
portant for a patient to be able to exercise freedom in choosing his or her 
medical care. However, a patient's freedom should not be exalted "to such 
an extent that it becomes an absolute ... source of values."174 "Autonomy 
is of great value, but its value does not lie in the freedom to make any 
choice. It lies in the freedom to make good choices; to fully appropriate 
into one's being the value of goodness and to participate in the creation of 
167. See supra sec. IV and accompanying text. 
168. See Newsmax.com, supra n. 16 ("The conscience that matters most belongs to the 
patient."). 
169. See Sophia Brumby, A Prescription for Discrimination, Cavalier Daily (Apr. 22. 2005) 
(available at http://www.cavalierdaily.comlCVarticle.asp?1D=23366&pid= 1295). 
170. Cantor & Baum, supra n. 13. at 2010. 
171. See Holly Teliska, Student Author, Obstacles to Access: How Pharmacist Refusal 
Clauses Undermine the Basic Health Care Needs of Rural and Low-Income Women, 20 Berkeley 
J. Gender L. & Just. 229 (2005). 
172. Pell, supra n. 162, at 25. 
173. Sean Murphy, Freedom of Conscience and the Needs of the Patient (Banff, Alberta, Nov. 
2001) (available at http://www .consciencelaws.orgiConscience-Archive/SpeecheslFreedom%20 
Conscience%20Needs%20Patient.pdf). 
174. Pope John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor, No. 32 (Aug, 6, 1993) (available at http://www. 
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future possibilities of goodness."175 Freedom should thus be interpreted as 
freedom for a given thing: freedom "for discerning the good that needs to 
be done, for choosing the good, for doing goOd."176 Viewing autonomy as 
the freedom to choose what is good recognizes that humans flourish when 
they are able to choose between competing goods in order to select those 
that are most compatible with their interests and desires. 177 
In order to choose what is good, one must be able to "form convictions 
about what is truly good and live accordingly."178 Thus, human freedom 
must be integrally connected to the truth. 179 Disconnecting autonomy and 
truth allows the individual to be the "supreme tribunal of moral judgment 
which hands down categorical and infallible decisions about good and 
evil."180 This unfettered right to do whatever one wants can lead to disas-
trous effects. A definition of freedom that is indifferent to the moral value 
of the choices made "justifies the strong seeking to enslave the weak and 
the rich seeking to profit from the misery of the pOOr."181 Freedom to do 
immoral acts does not serve either the individual or society.182 Because 
freedom is connected to truth, patient autonomy has its limits. Society has 
the right to restrict patients' choices, especially when those choices would 
cause harm to the patient (in the case of assisted suicide) or others, such as 
the unborn, death row inmates, or pharmacists. 
Furthermore, even if one accepts the "freedom to do anything" defini-
tion of autonomy, allowing a patient to order the pharmacist to fill a pre-
scription severely infringes upon the pharmacist's own right to autonomy. 
As social critic lain Benson recognizes: 
In medicine where two people are involved, autonomy is al-
ways a two-way street. Yes, the patient or "client" has his or her 
autonomy; but so, too, does the practitioner. There is no good 
reason (except perhaps one grounded in an anti-religious bias) to 
advocate that a patient's autonomy should trump the autonomy of 
the professional health-care worker just because the two views 
conflict. 183 
According to Francis Manion, senior counsel at the American Center 
for Law and Justice, "It comes down to a societal choice of what we value 
175. Teresa Stanton Collett, Professional Versus Moral Duty: Accepting Appointments in Un-
just Civil Cases, 32 Wake Forest L. Rev. 635, 649 (Fall 1997). 
176. Pope John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae, supra n. 166. 
177. See generally Robert P. George, Making Men Moral: Civil Liberties and Public Morality 
(Clarendon Press 1993). 
178. Murphy, supra n. 173. 
179. [d. 
180. Pope John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae, supra n. 166. 
181. Collett, supra n. 175, at 650. 
182. [d. 
183. lain T. Benson, "Autonomy." "Justice" and the Legal Requirement to Accommodate the 
Conscience and Religious Beliefs of Professionals in Health Care, http://www.consciencelaws. 
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more deeply .... I hope even today that we value and individual's freedom 
of conscience more than we value the instant convenience of the customer 
coming in for a particular service."I84 The "customer is always right" phi-
losophy may be the best guiding principle for McDonald's, but it is an inap-
propriate standard for medical ethics. 185 
h. Who Is Imposing on Whom? 
Those who seek to block conscience protection for pharmacists argue 
that a pharmacist should not be allowed to impose his or her views on the 
patient. However, when the patient's views differ from those of the phar-
macist, the question is: who is imposing on whom in this situation? When a 
pharmacist declines to dispense a prescription, he is not making a moral 
judgment about the patient, but he is making a moral judgment about his 
own actions-about his moral obligation to avoid doing what he believes is 
wrong. A conscientious objector's main concern is to avoid taking part in 
an immoral act. 186 Forcing a pharmacist to provide a medication that the 
pharmacist believes will lead to the death of a person is imposing the pa-
tient's views onto the pharmacist, not the other way around. 
Opponents of conscience protection believe that ethics are like tools; a 
person can have one set at home, one set in the office, and another when he 
goes out on the town. 187 However, many pharmacists do not view their 
ethics as tools "that can be picked up or put down, used or discarded, de-
pending upon the situation or circumstances involved."188 Rather, consci-
entious-objecting pharmacists internalize their ethics, making them a part of 
their personal identities. "[When] a person has only one identity, served by 
a single conscience that governs his conduct in private and professional life 
... [w]e identify this as the virtue of personal integrity."189 Therefore, it is 
often impossible for a pharmacist not to bring her ethics into the work-
place-to ask her to do otherwise would be to violate her integrity. 
c. Acting According to Conscience v. Discrimination 
Some claim that society should not support conscience clause legisla-
tion because "the contours of conscientious objection remain unclear."19o 
184. Molly McDonough, Rxfor Controversy, 4 ABA 1. E·Report 3 (June 10,2005). 
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Conscience clauses without limit raise the valid concern that a pharmacist 
would have license to discriminate against certain classes of people when 
refusing to dispense medications. For example, some worry that a pharma-
cist who believes that HIV is caused by immoral behavior would be able to 
refuse to fill prescriptions for HIV drugs. 191 However, just because con-
science clauses have potential for abuse is no reason to ban conscience 
clauses all together. 
First, conscience clauses should be aimed at protecting pharmacists 
from dispensing particular drugs that cause an effect that the pharmacist 
deems immoral, e.g., abortion or suicide; these clauses should not enable 
pharmacists to target particular individuals that the pharmacist deems im-
moral-e.g., those with HIV -when refusing to dispense. A pharmacist in 
Oregon who is morally opposed to dispensing drugs for assisted suicide 
refuses to dispense the drug because of the drug's effect, not because he 
does not like the particular person who is seeking the drug. On the other 
hand, a pharmacist who refuses to dispense HIV drugs does so not because 
he feels the effects of the drug are wrong. but rather because he has a bias 
against persons with HIV. The former pharmacist should be protected; the 
latter should not. 
To avoid the discrimination problem, conscientious objection can be 
limited through the wording of the legislation. Because most pharmacist 
conscientious objection centers around abortifacients, lethal drugs for as-
sisted suicide, and drugs used for capital punishment,192 state legislation 
could limit the conscience clause protection to those particular situations. 
For example, South Dakota's conscience clause is codified as, "No pharma-
cist may be required to dispense medication if there is reason to believe that 
the medication would be used to: (1) cause an abortion; or (2) destroy an 
unborn child ... ;P93] or (3) cause the death of any person by means of an 
assisted suicide, euthanasia, or mercy killing."194 A state where pharma-
cists are involved with capital punishment by lethal injections could include 
language in the legislation to cover that situation as well. According to the 
objecting pharmacist, these three types of drugs have the intended effect of 
killing a human life in common. Limiting legislation to these situations will 
focus the objection on the effects of the drugs and will prevent pharmacists 
from targeting particular classes of people. 
Even if narrowly drafted conscience clauses leave room for potential 
misuse, states should not refrain from enacting them. No law is free from 
the possibility of the slippery slope argument-even the most carefully 
drafted laws can be abused. As one judge put it: 
191. [d. at 2010. 
192. See supra sec. IV(b). 
193. "Unborn child" is defined as "an individual organism of the species homo sapiens from 
fertilization to live birth." S.D. Codified Laws § 22-1(50A) (2006). 
194. S.D. Codified Laws § 36-22-70 (2006). 
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Hypothetical cases of great evils may be suggested by a particu-
larly fruitful imagination in regard to almost every law upon 
which depends the rights of the individual or of the government, 
and if the existence of laws is to depend upon their capacity to 
withstand such criticism, the whole fabric of the law must fail. 195 
d. Pharmacists Will Not Block Access to "Needed" Drugs 
Proponents of requiring pharmacists to prescribe abortifacients and 
other lethal drugs argue that pharmacists will block access to drugs that 
patients "need." This argument is flawed, because, first, it presupposes that 
abortifacients and lethal drugs are "needs" of the patient. Loosely defined, 
a "need" is some good that is essential for the well-being of the patient.196 
So, if an abortifacient is not a bona fide need, pharmacists may not be obli-
gated to dispense it. The problem lies in deciding who defines what the 
patient's needs are. Is it the patient? What if the patient is wrong about 
what he or she "needs"? 
For example, there is a mental illness called body integrity identity 
disorder which causes a patient to want to cut off his perfectly healthy leg 
or arm. 197 These patients really believe that they need to have their limbs 
amputated. The patient, consistent with the World Health Organization's 
definition of health, thinks that the amputation would improve his "mental 
and social well-being."198 Does this mean that the doctor must ensure that 
the patient's limb is cut off? Of course not. But this example illustrates 
that our definition of needs depends entirely upon what we believe to be 
conducive to human well-being. 199 We often cannot achieve a consensus 
about the morality of a procedure because we are operating from different 
beliefs about the nature of the human person.200 
Contrary to many patients, a number of pharmacists do not believe that 
abortifacients and lethal medications are bona fide needs of the patient. 
They are elective treatments. Just because these drugs are legal does not 
mean that they are an entitlement. Although, according to the Supreme 
Court, the government cannot make abortion illegal, women do not have the 
right to demand abortion from every medical provider or pharmacist. It is 
legitimate not to view the killing of an individual (whether it be an unborn 
child or the patient) as a "need." 
195. U.S. v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196,217 (1882) (Gray, J., dissenting). 
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198. Murphy, supra n. 173, at 2 (quoting the 1948 World Health Organization definition of 
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Second, the argument that pharmacists will block access is misplaced, 
because conscience clauses would not make any prescriptions inaccessible. 
These drugs will still be available. Patients will still have access to them, 
they just will not be able to require an individual pharmacist to dispense 
them. As pharmacist Susan Grosskreuz puts it, "This isn't about making 
birth control pills unavailable to the general population of women, which 
Planned Parenthood would like you to believe. This is just about my right 
not to participate in an act that clearly goes against my conscience."201 
If a certain drug is stocked in a pharmacy, there are likely to be phar-
macists who work there who are willing to dispense it. Most pharmacists 
give their employers prior notification of their conscientious objection to 
certain drugs, so the pharmacy is able to come up with a plan to ensure that 
patients have access to those medications,z°2 This often allows the pharma-
cist to exercise her conscience rights without the patient even knowing. For 
example, when a person comes for birth control pills, the pharmacist can 
just unassumingly defer to her coworkers. 
If the conscientious-objecting pharmacist is the only one on duty that 
day, the patient may have to wait until the next day, or drive to another 
pharmacy to get the prescription. Just because it is not as convenient does 
not mean that there is not access. The pharmacist's right to be free from 
forced violation of her conscience outweighs the patient's burden of going 
to another pharmacy. Furthermore, most drugs, including time-sensitive 
emergency contraceptives, are now available to anyone, anywhere from on-
line pharmacies, with overnight delivery,z°3 
To alleviate the patient's hassle of going to a pharmacy and having her 
prescription refused, pharmacists can work with their pharmacies to create 
mechanisms that would give patients advance notice regarding when a 
pharmacist with moral objections to abortifacients or lethal drugs will be on 
duty,z04 For example, a schedule could be conspicuously posted to alert 
patients as to when these controversial drugs will be available to 
customers.205 
VII. REFERRAL AS A FALSE COMPROMISE 
a. Cooperation with Evil 
As a "compromise" between patients' and pharmacists' rights, many 
people suggest adding a section into conscience clauses that requires the 
conscientious objector to refer the patient to someone who will provide 
201. Wis. Sen. Lab. Comm., Hearing on Sen. Bill 21, 2003 Sess. (testimony of phannacist 
Susan Grosskreuz, R.Ph.) (Mar. 5, 2003). 
202. See Herbe, supra n. 129, at 101. 
203. See e.g. eDrugstore.md, Plan B (Levonorgestrel), http://www.edrugstore.mdIPlan-B-
(Levonorgestrel).jsp (Feb. 27, 2006). 
204. See Herbe, supra n. 129. at 101. 
205. [d. 
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what is wanted. or assist the patient to that end. For example, the con-
science clause provided by AphA requires a pharmacist to refer the patient 
to another pharmacist or distributor if the pharmacist refuses to dispense the 
prescription herself.206 However, required referral is really not a compro-
mise at all. 
For many pharmacists, a referral would be morally wrong, because it 
would still constitute participation in the immoral activity of dispensing an 
abortifacient or lethal drug.207 These pharmacists recognize that moral cul-
pability does not just attach to direct participation in X, it also attaches to 
facilitating the provision of X by someone else.208 For example, if someone 
comes to you and asks you to kill his ex-girlfriend, you will still be culpable 
for the wrongdoing if you hire a hit man to do it instead. The law recog-
nizes this as well-one can be charged for a bank robbery if one assists the 
robber by providing a weapon, even if one is absent when the robbery oc-
curs. Therefore, if it is morally objectionable to a pharmacist to dispense a 
drug to be used for an assisted suicide, it will be just as morally objectiona-
ble for the pharmacist to help the patient find another pharmacist to provide 
the lethal drug. 
Evangelium Vitae reiterates Catholic moral teaching about the sinful-
ness of cooperation in evil actions. "Christians, like all people of good will, 
are called upon under grave obligation of conscience not to cooperate in 
practices which. even if permitted by civil legislation, are contrary to God's 
law. Indeed, from the moral standpoint. it is never licit to cooperate for-
mally in evil. "209 The Encyclical goes on to describe "formal" cooperation, 
which "occurs when an action, either by its very nature or by the form it 
takes in a concrete situation, can be defined as a direct participation in an 
act against innocent human life or a sharing in the immoral intention of the 
person committing it."210 
An example of such formal cooperation might be the father of a child 
about to be aborted urging the woman to have an abortion, or consenting to 
it. In the case of a doctor performing an abortion, a nurse who prepares for 
and assists in the procedure willingly would be gUilty of formal coopera-
tion. For a pharmacist, both dispensing a prescription for an abortifacient 
and assisting the patient to find another pharmacy to dispense it would con-
stitute cooperation with evi1.211 
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b. Alternative Options that Don't Compromise Pharmacists' 
Consciences 
167 
Because requiring referral does little to alleviate the pharmacist's 
moral duties, in addition to conscience clauses, society needs to come up 
with alternative solutions, other than required referral, in order to allow the 
pharmacist to exercise his or her conscience freely. 
Wisconsin has already done this and now has a hotline for people to 
call for information on where to get emergency contraception.212 In addi-
tion, as Planned Parenthood advises women, "You can get the names and 
phone numbers of five emergency contraception providers nearest you by 
calling, toll-free, the emergency contraception hotline: 1-888-NOT-2-
LATE. Or contact the nearest Planned Parenthood health center at 1-800-
230-PLAN."213 Emergency contraception hotlines provide a balance be-
tween the wishes of the patient and the rights of the pharmacist; the patient 
can find access to the prescription and the pharmacist does not have to 
violate his or her conscience through the referraL 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Society can demonstrate respect for medical professionals' religious 
freedom in two ways. Either it can refrain from passing laws that conflict 
with religious ethical and moral teaching, or in passing such laws, it can 
include conscience clauses to protect the freedom of health care profession-
als to remain faithful to their consciences.214 Since the former option is 
unfortunately unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future, society must 
work to see that the second option is implemented in order to protect the 
fundamental rights of medical professionals. 
One cannot serve two masters and must eventually choose one over the 
other.215 It is wrong to require medical professionals to choose between 
their religious beliefs and their jobs. If a pharmacist believes that accom-
modating prescriptions for abortifacients or other lethal drugs would be fa-
cilitating the death of another, thus violating his or her duty to God, the 
pharmacist should never be forced to engage in such a practice. Therefore, 
we as a society need to ensure that health care professionals' religious 
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returning the rightful property of the patient. 
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rights are protected through conscience clause legislation. If we do not pro-
vide protections to ensure that freedom of conscience is respected, religious 
health care professionals and providers will become an endangered species. 
